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Abstract
The growing involvement of the Chinese state and 
business in Africa has generated significant debate 
about China’s Africa strategy and its benefits for Africa’s 
development. Chinese policymakers have become 
increasingly oriented toward improving African 
countries’ agricultural productivity. This paper focuses 
on how state-business interactions influence agricultural 
development outcomes, using Zimbabwe as a country of 
study. It explores the question of how far the State can 
control business and direct development by identifying 
the key relationships that influence the decision-making 
processes of state and business actors within China 
and its African engagement. The paper challenges 
the conventional wisdom of homogenised, unitary 
relations, and argues that these relations are, in practice, 
heterogeneous, as a result of the Chinese state being 
disaggregated into a multiplicity of provincial relations 
and central state agencies, and because of tensions arising 
between commercial market and political interests. 
The active role of African governments in agricultural 
schemes is also affecting outcomes. The findings of a brief 
ethnographic analysis of four state-business schemes 
in Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector suggest that where 
African agriculture is concerned, a wide range of Chinese 
agencies are involved, with businesses being driven by 
either market forces or national state interests, which 
together make outcomes increasingly less generalisable.
Introduction
In recent years, there has been a sustained, and at times 
intense, debate about the nature of the contribution 
made by the Chinese state and Chinese firms to Africa’s 
development. The question of what role the Chinese 
state and Chinese ‘state capitalism’ in particular play in 
Africa’s development has fascinated the world. There is 
continuing debate between those who see China’s role 
as rapacious and even colonial, and label the Chinese-
African relations as asymmetrical and unstable (Clinton 
2011; Fisher 2011; Askouri 2007; Naim 2007; Zafar 2007; 
Tull 2006), and those who see China as a developmental 
role-model and Africa’s relationship with China as having 
more benefits than harms (Diaw and Lessoua 2013; 
Renard 2011; Fantu and Cyril 2010; Kamwanga and Koyi 
2009; Asche and Schüller 2008). In the first viewpoint, 
the Chinese state and Chinese national interests are 
central to understanding China’s development role in 
Africa. Here, Chinese state capitalism works through 
intimate state-business relations; the government 
hand-in-hand with state-owned enterprises and, less 
overtly or directly, with the burgeoning Chinese private 
firms ‘going out’ to Africa. Within the second school of 
thought, the new relationship between the Chinese state 
and Chinese business has already brought significant 
financial and practical infrastructural, production, trade 
and investment benefits to many African economies.
The role and impact of the Chinese state and 
businesses is thus a controversial topic, with claims of 
‘win-win’ mutual benefits offset by mounting African 
and international criticism. Significant question marks 
are raised over China’s Africa policy and the benefits 
for Africa’s sustainable development. Chinese state-
business relations (SBRs) are key factors in explaining 
China’s engagement in Africa, but our understanding of 
the Chinese ‘state’ and ‘business’ sectors need to move 
beyond the often homogenised portrait delineated 
above. The Chinese state’s relationship with business is 
populated by a wide range of commercial, diplomatic 
and financial agencies and interests operating at multiple 
levels of government. Similarly, there are diverse business 
organisations ranging from state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) to out-and-out private firms.
This paper aims to build a closer understanding of 
the diverse factors that influence the Chinese state-
business model as it is implemented in Africa. A clearer 
understanding of how SBRs work is critical for a more 
effective implementation of national, regional and 
international development policies. It also aims to 
increase awareness of how Chinese SBRs contribute 
to influence policymaking perspectives on key 
development challenges and, in so doing, to facilitate 
improved leverage of Chinese international development 
assistance. Finally, a viable agricultural sector is critical 
to sustainable development in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
and agricultural cooperation is a priority in Sino-African 
relations, set out since 2003 in the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC 2003). Under these objectives, the 
paper focuses on the insights that can be drawn from a 
closer examination of the role and significance of China’s 
SBRs in the agricultural sectors of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Four key questions are asked about Chinese SBRs: 
1.  How, and to what extent, are Chinese businesses in 
Africa regulated and constrained by Chinese state-
level and provincial-level policy and strategy? How 
do businesses manage tensions and contradictions 
between these different levels of objectives and 
policy regulation? 
2.  To what extent, and with what effects, are Chinese 
businesses regulated and controlled by the country-
specific governments and regulations in Africa? 
3.  What happens in terms of micro-level interactions 
when Chinese businesses seek to manage 
day-to-day business transactions? How do they 
navigate tensions between Chinese and African 
regulations and policy? 
4.  What are the implications of these micro-level 
interactions in terms of shaping and influencing 
the ways in which Chinese ‘state-business led 
development’ operates in practice? 
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This study explores these questions by going beyond 
conventional stereotypes to investigate how SBRs work 
on the ground in SSA’s agriculture. 
The character of ‘Chinese state capitalism’ in Africa 
is extensively debated. Increasingly there is more 
recognition of the diversity, disaggregation and lack 
of coordination between China’s state and business 
organisations, both within China and in its African 
involvement. More importantly, recent debates have 
slowly departed from perceiving Africa as a passive 
recipient, emphasising the active role of governments 
in development schemes. Building on this work and 
based on author’s fieldwork, this paper takes a step 
further by disaggregating SBRs using the agricultural 
sector in Zimbabwe as a case study. It briefly traces the 
way SBRs have been looked at in the academic literature; 
explains how SBRs work within China, in Africa, in African 
agriculture and in Zimbabwe; and concludes by returning 
to the main questions in the light of its findings.
State-Business Relations in China
The reform era has presided over unprecedented 
economic growth in modern Chinese history. Clearly, 
today’s structures, processes and agencies of relations 
between the Communist Party, the state and the 
economy have changed fundamentally in the Reform 
Era. The trajectory of change saw the steady increase 
in managerial autonomy; separation of company 
ownership and management; privatisation of inefficient 
and loss-making firms; and eventual freedom to establish 
new independent enterprises. The portrait painted 
of this transition, the orthodox reading, is one of a 
coherent programme of state-led reforms with China’s 
phenomenal growth driven by the Communist Party 
and state exercising central direction and control of 
SOEs. SBRs were thus very close. Beyond this image, 
however, lies a more complex reality, a more crowded 
and variegated arena of agencies affecting change and 
driving economic growth in the first two decades of 
reform: private farming, township enterprises, private 
business in cities and the Special Economic Zones, as 
well as regional competition (Coase and Wang 2013; Hu 
and Khan 1997).
The evolution of state-business relationships in China
SBRs in China have gone through five major stages: 
(1)  Pre-reform and opening up (1949-1977). SBRs are 
characterised by an inseparability of party and 
state and the direct administration of enterprises 
by government agencies.
(2)  Reform begins (1978-1984). Failures of the existing 
SBRs are recognised and new relations established 
based on a limited degree of decentralisation of 
power and profit retention by enterprises. SOEs 
remain under direct state control and direction in 
a planned economic system. This stage marks the 
beginning of institutionalised SBRs in China.
 
(3)  State-business contracts (1984-1992). New rules allow 
for separation of ownership and management. 
Enterprises can contract with the government and 
their independent management rights are protected 
by law. SBRs are diversified further by the creation 
of township enterprises. SBRs are characterised by 
tensions between state and management, market 
imperfections and managerial deficiencies, and 
efficiency and equity.
(4)  Constructing a modern corporate system: SOE reform 
(1993-2003). The enterprise system is defined as a 
system with clear ownership, specified rights and 
responsibility, separation of state and business and 
scientific management. The major breakthrough 
during this period is the separation of state and 
business. The importance of non-state-owned 
companies is recognised and the influence of 
government on business extends from SOEs to 
private-owned enterprises. 
(5)  Deepening reform and market-oriented SBRs (2004-
present). SBRs are held to have entered a new phase 
where state-organised governance now operates 
as the key influence, with SBRs displaying the dual 
characteristics of both serving government interests 
and influencing the growth and development of the 
companies involved. 
Institutional agencies
The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the State-
Owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council (SASAC), provincial 
governments, private enterprises and Chambers of 
Commerce all frame China’s SBRs. Starting with MOFCOM, 
this ministry has the main responsibility for policy 
coordination and implementation in respect to all trade-
related issues.  MOFCOM administrates and implements 
legislation on economic and trade affairs, regulating 
competition and managing administrative aspects 
of trade and investment, such as import and export 
regulations, coordinating with sub-state governmental 
tiers and engaging with international organisations and 
agencies. 
However, the key feature in transition has been the 
growing significance of the provinces in SBRs. According 
to one recent assessment, there are approximately 
100,000 sub-national SOEs and these operate in a 
highly variegated landscape of provincial government 
regulations, for example inter-provincial barriers to 
mergers and acquisitions (Szamosszegi and Kyle 2011: 26). 
Donaldson’s analysis of the diverse provincial development 
pathways illustrates these by explaining differences 
in Yunnan and Guizhou provinces, characterised as 
‘a type of outward oriented developmental state’ in 
the case of Yunnan and a ‘micro-oriented’ state in the 
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case of Guizhou. Yunnan’s provincial economy focused 
resources in limited geographical areas, promoting 
tourism in the south and pockets of the northwest, 
tobacco in the southwest and coal mining in various 
areas. Road infrastructure supported the entire plan. 
However, the development approach in Yunnan was not 
considered pro-poor. It marginalised many of the poor 
people by making it difficult for them to participate in 
the structured industries. On the other hand, Guizhou’s 
leaders focussed on shifting rural labour (through 
out-of-province migration) and targeted farmers with 
aims of increasing their home incomes by promoting 
local markets and small scale industries such as rural 
tourism and coal mining. The ‘micro-oriented’ state in 
this way supported activities that poor people can access, 
particularly those requiring little formal education and 
technical experience (Donaldson 2013: 4). 
Bremmer (2009) argues that there are four primary 
actors in state capitalism: national oil corporations, SOEs, 
privately-owned national champions, and sovereign 
wealth funds (SWFs). China has the second-largest number 
of Fortune Global 500 companies in the world, most of 
which are SOEs (Lin and Milhaupt 2013). These SOEs 
comprise a highly distinctive characteristic of Chinese 
state capitalism. They are organised into corporate 
groups under a central government agency, the SASAC. 
The SASAC has been described as ‘the world’s largest 
controlling shareholder,’ because it holds controlling 
stakes in the largest and most important firms. Each 
company’s majority shareholder, or parent company, 
is fully owned by the SASAC. Parent companies are 
contractually bound to promote the policies of the state, 
and are in charge of coordinating the group’s activities. 
Often, individual corporate groups are linked through 
equity ownership and contractual alliances to groups in 
the same or in complementary industries, to business 
groups, or even to institutions such as universities.
As Bremmer has noted previously, a defining 
characteristic of state capitalism is ‘the existence of close 
ties binding together those who govern a country and 
those who run its enterprises’ (Bremmer 2009). This is 
certainly the case in China, as the Communist Party 
and SASAC jointly manage the personnel appointment 
process in a ‘helical’ manner. Thus, managers of ‘national 
champions’ regularly hold important positions in the 
Communist Party on a rotating or simultaneous basis. For 
this reason, as well as the strategic way in which business 
groups are linked to each other and government bodies, 
Lin and Milhaupt (2013) call the organisational structure 
of Chinese state capitalism a ‘networked hierarchy’. The 
networks facilitate information flow, foster collaboration 
in production and policy implementation, and provide 
strong incentives for leaders within the system, because 
success in business leads to rewards in the political 
realm and vice versa. Thus, as Xing and Shaw (2013: 95) 
argue, ‘Chinese state capitalism is a distinct form of state 
capitalism shaped and determined by its internal political 
reality and characterised by the active state intervention 
and corporative state-business relations’. 
An important consideration in this respect is the 
importance of Chinese Chambers of Commerce (CoCs). 
The past decade has seen these emerged to become an 
important factor in China’s SBRs, economic development 
and commercial diplomacy: ‘These organisations are 
changing the structures by which China is governed and 
policy is made,’ writes Fewsmith (2005: 1). In the context 
of privatisation, the market reform process of the Chinese 
economy and SBRs, CoCs play an intermediary, regulatory 
role between state and business (Mengfu 2005; Xiaochen 
2003; Hui 2002; Heping 1993) and, as discussed below, 
are playing an increasing role in Chinese SBRs in Africa. 
The evolving domestic state-business relationship 
described above will be investigated in the context 
of African agricultural development. How does this 
multiplicity of actors, this diversity, play out in practice? 
What roles do the diplomatic and commercial missions, 
the official face of the Chinese state, play? These are 
questions that inform the following discussion and are 
explored in detail in the case studies from the agriculture 
sector in Africa.
Chinese State Capitalism in Africa
The widespread portrait painted of China’s SBRs in 
Africa is of state-directed, collusive behaviour. This is 
said to be most evident in Chinese SOEs acquiring the 
critical resources needed by China to sustain its economic 
growth and in Chinese manufacturers taking advantage 
of lower-cost labour to reach the burgeoning consumer 
demand from the emerging affluent African middle class. 
In this perspective, the Chinese state’s role in Africa is to 
use a wide range of diplomatic instruments to facilitate 
the access and operations of Chinese business. These 
include the use of Chinese international development 
assistance (IDA) to fund development projects to be 
undertaken by Chinese firms (and largely, imported 
Chinese workers) - effectively, undisguised tied aid. 
Clearly, there are aspects of this portrait that are valid; 
the Chinese state’s economic strategic priorities form a 
powerful directive influence for Chinese business and 
Chinese foreign development assistance requires, in 
practice, Chinese firms to do the work. From the Chinese 
standpoint, however, Chinese development assistance 
(broadly defined), SOE resources and private firm FDI all 
contribute significantly to African development. 
The Chinese state’s role vis-a-vis Chinese business in 
Africa is, undoubtedly, substantial; but it is contextual 
rather than directive in character. There are four principal 
dimensions. Firstly, the government’s policy framework 
provides the context, authority and legitimacy for 
Chinese firms to go to Africa. Here the key policies are 
the ‘Africa policy’ and the ‘going global’ (Zouchuqu) policy. 
Secondly, the state has established a strong, dedicated, 
interlocking institutional network of agencies at home to 
support Chinese firms ‘going out’ to Africa. Together these 
provide not only robust practical support for businesses, 
but also offer demonstrable evidence of long-term 
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commitment and policy durability – the predictability 
noted by historical and institutional analysis. Thirdly, the 
Chinese state has engaged in unprecedented economic 
diplomacy in Africa. This has two dimensions: multilateral 
(pan-African) and bilateral (state-to-state) diplomacy. 
The former is driven through FOCAC, a dialogue and 
institutionalised process for cooperation established in 
2000. The latter is driven by extensive tours of African 
states by Chinese state and Communist Party officials, as 
well as bilateral cooperation agreements on everything 
ranging from loans, guarantees and technical assistance 
to cultural exchanges and educational scholarships. 
Fourthly, Chinese business also benefits from the 
warmer relations generated by the Chinese state’s wider 
political diplomacy evident in South-South dialogue and 
cooperation and in the United Nations – with China 
presenting itself as a leading voice of the developing 
world, critical of traditional donors and powers, and 
urging greater genuine help for African peoples.
The ‘going global’ strategy, a central policy, originated 
with the Third Plenum of the 15th Congress of the 
Communist Part of China in 2000. This externally-oriented 
policy was to run in tandem with the internally-oriented 
‘inviting in’ (Yinjinlai) strategy, designed to bring in 
Western capital, technology and business, as the two 
pillars of China’s opening up policy. By the third plenum 
of the 18th Congress in November 2013, the position of 
the Communist Party was that: 
China should encourage firms and individuals to 
invest abroad. The firms and individuals should 
try their best to pursue international cooperation. 
If they can take the risk, they can go to anywhere 
abroad to develop business. We also encourage 
land investment, merger investment, securities 
investment and joint investment abroad. (Xinhua 
News 2013)
The principal institutional infrastructure for Chinese 
SBRs in Africa includes the Chinese State Council; a 
spectrum of government ministries, most notably Foreign 
Affairs and Commerce as well as Agriculture and Health; 
financial institutions such as the China Export-Import 
Bank; and the primary decision-making committees of 
the Communist Party. Specific institutional structures 
and processes have emerged to foster China’s African 
relations. For example, China established eleven Chinese 
investment and trade promotion centres in Africa (Gu 
2011). Multilateral engagement operates through the 
FOCAC framework. African economic development 
requires investment, infrastructure, skills and markets 
to break out of the ‘raw materials in exchange for 
manufactures’ syndrome, to have greater value-added 
in the African phase of global value chains and to be able 
to have ‘ownership’ of its economic development. The 
Chinese state has provided substantial financial support 
to Africa in the past 13 years of FOCAC in the form of 
so-called ‘soft’ loans (lacking the conditionality of the 
traditional donor system), guarantees and sovereign 
debt relief. 
The Chinese government estimates that it has 
offered soft loans worth more than US$15bn to 
Africa within the FOCAC framework alone. FOCAC 
has also provided a platform for promoting China-
Africa business relations. For example, the 2007-2009 
FOCAC Action Plan provided for an agreement on the 
‘Bilateral Facilitation and Protection of Investment and 
the Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation’; 
strengthening of cooperation among their respective 
SMEs to promote Africa’s industrial development and 
enhance Africa’s production and export capacity; and 
to encourage ‘well-established’ Chinese companies 
to set up three to five overseas economic and trade 
cooperation zones in African countries. (FOCAC 2006). 
Also within the FOCAC institutional infrastructure is 
the China-Africa Development Fund (CADFund). This 
was set up in 2007 to encourage and support Chinese 
corporate investment in Africa. By 2013, it had funded 72 
projects in 30 African countries. According to Wang Yong, 
CADFund Vice-President, the immediate aim from 2013 
onwards is to accelerate investment activities in Africa, 
concentrating on manufacturing (in particular, industry 
parks), infrastructure and agriculture ‘as these sectors 
are more crucial in terms of increasing the capacity of 
economies of the African continent, which in turn benefit 
the Fund’ (Xinhua News 2013c). 
For Chinese businesses, there are useful aspects of the 
Chinese government’s institutional support that can be 
drawn upon for information about Africa’s investment 
climate, financing or even diplomatic assistance. But 
the principal sources of information about Africa have 
been through friends or networking introductions and 
through business’ own research and trading experiences, 
only then followed by the Chinese central government, 
embassies and local Chinese community networks in 
Africa, and finally by Chinese local government or other 
local firms (Author’s interviews 2011). A key challenge 
for effective Chinese SBRs in Africa is a perceived gap 
between state policy formulation and implementation, 
that is, between the publicly-stated national goals of 
China and the African states, and the actual competitive 
realities of business practices facing Chinese firms in Africa. 
There is sometimes a lack of knowledge about Africa, and 
another gap exists between the ‘last golden land’ in the 
imagination of entrepreneurs and the reality, which is that 
many firms lose. Whilst many Chinese investors are going 
out, many are also coming back, carrying debts with them 
(Gu 2011: 29). Meeting this challenge, the China-Africa 
Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry was formed 
in 2006 and has carried out a number of activities. There 
have been a series of meetings, conferences and forum 
held over the past decade to foster business-to-business 
relations; indicative of these are a High-Level Dialogue 
between Chinese and African Leaders and Business 
Representatives, a Conference of Chinese and African 
Entrepreneurs, the China-Africa Business Forum and the 
China-Africa Forum on SME Cooperation as well as the 
rapid development of the China-Africa Business Council 
providing contacts, information briefings and training 
for Chinese firms. 
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Beyond the ‘Conventional’ 
Wisdom
China’s presence in Africa has become highly 
controversial over the past decade as Chinese trade, aid 
and investment have flowed into Africa. Wolf et al. (2013), 
who examined China’s SOE investment in a broader 
engagement portfolio, have coined the concept ‘FAGIA’ 
(foreign aid and government-sponsored investment 
activities) to describe China’s active engagement in other 
developing countries, particularly for natural resources. 
Chinese companies have been depicted as ‘new colonials’ 
and as ‘rapacious exploiters’ lacking transparency and 
good corporate citizenship (Fisher 2011; Zafar 2007; Tull 
2006). Within this framing, the Chinese model of state 
capitalism has faced significant criticisms. First it has been 
said that China depresses its overall competitiveness 
by pouring money into inefficiently managed state 
champions. In 2012 The Economist noted that ‘A handful 
[of SOEs] with privileged market access generate more 
than half of all profits,’ arguing that, if state-owned firms 
were to pay market interest rates, their profits ‘would be 
entirely wiped out.’
Another literature has pointed to the more complex 
and multifaceted nature of China’s overseas investment by 
SOEs (Bräutigam and Zhang 2013; Chintu and Williamson 
2013; Kaplinsky and Morris 2009). For example, in a recent 
article Xu Yi-Chong (2014) observes that some of the SOEs 
operating in Africa seem to oppose the agenda of the 
central Chinese state, and asks, ‘why has the Party-state 
permitted them to become semi-independent privateers, 
whose activities do not always coincide with the interests 
of the Party-state? More importantly, since they are, after 
all, state-owned, what are the mechanisms and levers 
of control the state still has? Is it able to exert control 
over its SOEs, their activities and behaviour in Africa?’ 
His conclusion suggests that it is simplistic to see China 
as a monolith, under the perception of a new colonialist 
looting African land and resources. In his words, ‘Its 
interests are much broader and its SOEs and other players 
vary significantly in motivation and behaviour. For some, 
Africa “is a stepping stone to a commercial presence 
around the globe” and a place to build their reputation. 
For others, they work in Africa simply because “it pays”.
(Yi-Chong 2014: 825-826). 
Other scholars have focused on showing how 
negative rumours are produced by conspiracy-oriented 
interpretations as a new metaphor for China, and are seen 
as embedded in a discourse of negative characteristics 
(Hairong and Sautman 2012). In contrast, they argue, 
Chinese businesses are more flexible, more pragmatic, less 
risk-averse and have longer horizons than their northern 
counterparts who emphasise ‘shareholder value’ and 
who are constrained by conditionalities such as the Paris 
Declaration and the Accra Accord (Chintu and Williamson 
2013). This is not to say that Chinese enterprises might 
not display negative aspects or challenges. As Ian Taylor 
has perceptively noted, Chinese businesspeople might 
as well be driven by capitalistic interests, translating into 
lack of corporate responsibility, similarly to their Western 
counterparts (Taylor 2009). But he sees this more as a 
possible outcome of China’s liberalisation, rather than as 
a form of colonisation. Under this logic, it has become a 
challenge for the Chinese state to control and oversee 
the behaviour of all Chinese enterprises in China, which 
might in fact interfere with Beijing’s priority to safeguard 
its image of ‘responsible power’ in Africa (Taylor 2009: 
714).
The problems with the portrait offered by the 
conventional wisdom of state-business collusion are 
that: (a) SoEs, whilst still contextualised and influenced 
by Chinese state interests and policies, are increasingly 
independent and driven by the pressures of their own 
corporate commercial interests, needs and opportunities 
– they are, simply, more semi-detached from the state 
than hitherto was the case; (b) there are over 3,000 
Chinese businesses in Africa, and although expected 
to register with local Chinese diplomatic missions, 
many of the private businesses do not do so, leaving 
Chinese officials unaware of their operations unless a 
problem arises and the firm comes asking for assistance; 
and (c) there are simply so many Chinese agencies and 
businesses now in Africa that the sheer scale defies the 
logistics of systematic collusive SBRs, even if the intent 
be present. 
What is most important to note here is that businesses 
relations differ with the Chinese state and with the 
decentralised provinces. Roughly, there are (a) tightly 
controlled and financed companies linked to the 
central state; (b) provincial companies with strong 
involvement of the provincial state; (c) SoEs with nominal 
state ownership, but with increasing autonomy and 
commercial/profit requirements; and d) independent 
companies with limited state control and no state finance.
China and Zimbabwean 
Agriculture
In terms of Chinese agricultural engagement in 
Africa, it is more about politics and international 
relations, rather than agriculture per se. (Chinese 
agricultural aid expert in Africa, Author’s interview 
2014)
China provides substantial technical agricultural 
assistance to African countries, and investment in 
agriculture and food production in Africa is seen as a 
major priority (Xiaoyun et al. 2010). As far back as the 
2004-2006 Addis Ababa Action Plan, agriculture was 
made a priority, with China emphasising enhanced 
agricultural cooperation in such areas as land and water 
resource management, agro-infrastructure development, 
farming, breeding, aquaculture, food security, exchange 
and transfer of applied agricultural technology, skills 
transfer, technical assistance, manufacturing of farm 
machinery and processing of farm produce (FOCAC 
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2003). Following the Beijing Summit, China sent 104 
agricultural professionals to 33 African countries, 
including Morocco, Mali and Uganda, and imitated the 
construction of 10 agricultural demonstration centres 
that the government committed to help African counties 
to develop (FOCAC 2009).
 
Increasingly engaging with the sustainability of 
development, there are initiatives for the ‘greening’ of 
China-Africa relations, with China having expressed 
plans to introduce biogas technology, solar power, 
hydro power and wind power in some of the African 
countries. For example, the Centre for China-Africa 
Agriculture and Forestry Research, established by the 
International Network for Bamboo and Rattan (INBAR) 
and Zhejiang Agriculture and Forestry University 
(ZAFU), aims to undertake issues such as China-Africa 
investment and trade policies on agriculture and forestry, 
the management of bamboo resources, climate change 
strategies and technologies, and food safety. INBAR 
currently has fifteen African members.
The amount of Chinese state and business activity 
in the sector is substantial. This includes technical and 
skills transfers through China-sponsored training centres; 
a People’s Bank of China and Asian Development Bank 
joint seminar on rural financing; workshops on Poverty 
Eradication and Sustainable Development of Agriculture; 
and tariff exemptions for African export commodities to 
China. It also refers to Chinese commitment to build 100 
schools, 30 hospitals and 20 agri-tech demonstration 
centres; dispatch 100 senior experts on agricultural 
technologies to 35 African countries to help their 
governments formulate agricultural development plans; 
improve seed strains; pass on applicable agricultural 
technologies and managerial expertise and train local 
technicians; and encourage Chinese businesses through 
financial and policy incentive schemes to develop 
agricultural cooperation projects in Africa. 
With its long history of partnership and economic and 
political ties with China, Zimbabwe is an interesting and 
relevant country to study in terms of the role of Chinese 
state capitalism in Africa. Zimbabwe is also among the 
top four African countries for approved agricultural 
projects with Beijing (Bräutigam and Zhang 2013: 1683). 
China’s relations with Zimbabwe, and specifically Robert 
Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic 
Front (ZANU-PF), go back 35 years (MOFA 2015). China 
provided support to ZANU-PF in its fight against 
White majority rule, and this relationship was quickly 
consolidated following victory and independence in 1980 
(Taylor 2006). China has remained a partner to Zimbabwe, 
providing loans, guarantees and other financial supports 
through the post-independence years, most importantly 
after the European Union imposed sanctions in 2003. 
Whilst China’s support for President Mugabe and 
ZANU-PF has ebbed and flowed, Zimbabwe secured a 
major China EXIM Bank loan in 2011. China’s economic 
interest lies in Zimbabwean mining (such as diamonds 
and platinum deposits), agriculture, infrastructural 
development and communications technology. 
According to Chinese statistics, bilateral trade between 
China and Zimbabwe grew to over US$1.1bn in 2013, up 
from only US$310m in 2003 when Zimbabwe adopted 
its ‘look east’ policy following international isolation. The 
2013 trade figure represented an 8.5 percent increase 
over 2012. Zimbabwean exports were worth US$688m 
and Chinese imports valued at US$414m (Chirara and 
Kachembere 2014). 
There are about 80 Chinese companies in Zimbabwe, 
with privately-owned companies alone accounting for 
about two-thirds of the total number. However, the 
relationships between business associations/networks 
and companies are extensive. There are seven official 
and informal Chinese business council/provincial 
association networks operating in Harare. Given the 
number of Chinese agencies of different provincial 
origin, these councils and associations are competing 
with each other for influence. However, an important 
trend in recent years is for certain business councils to 
become more prominent on the back of official Chinese 
government support and encouragement. A case in point 
is the Zimbabwe-China Business Council Trust, which was 
established to engage the government in ‘creating an 
enabling environment for entrepreneurship’ and ‘enabling 
the imparting of good business practices to ensure that 
Zimbabwe China business activities contribute towards 
the poverty reduction and human development in 
both Zimbabwe and China’ (TheBehaviourReport.com 
2014). The case-study fieldwork showed that these 
increasingly powerful councils owe much of their rise 
to Chinese Embassy patronage. According to officials 
at the Chinese Embassy in Harare, regular meetings are 
held with business leaders through the Council to discuss 
issues such as corporate social responsibility. These 
include laws on provision of medical support to staff, and 
ways for businesses to establish good relations with the 
local people, such as through food donations (Author’s 
interview 2014). This patronage differs from a historical 
loose relationship between the Embassy and the Council, 
and resulted from an Embassy perception that existing 
associations were insufficiently responsive to their policy 
initiatives. Within the past five years, however, the central 
government from Beijing has worked to strengthen 
such relationships, establishing alternative pathways 
for policy messages to be disseminated to companies 
more effectively. Subsequently, these newer councils act 
as bridges or ‘half-way houses’ between the Embassy and 
Chinese business community, helping to communicate 
Chinese government policies and perspectives (Author’s 
interview 2014).
Chinese Agro-business in 
Zimbabwe 
Chinese agro-businesses have established a robust 
overseas profile and infrastructure through their overseas 
affiliates over the last decades. A key feature of China’s 
agribusiness is that its ‘going global’ is driven significantly 
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by China’s provinces with their own provincial SASAC, 
rather than the central government. Here the primary 
agencies are state-owned farms. According to Xiuli et al. 
(2014) this activity is substantial, with a third of Chinese 
agribusinesses overseas having made investments 
valued around US$3.3bn by the end of 2013.
The cases of businesses examined here focus mainly 
on the experiences of Chinese SBRs, and were selected 
so as to cover the variegated character of SBRs described 
in earlier sections. The companies here are all exempt 
from the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment 
Act, signed by Robert Mugabe in 2008 and put into force 
in 2010, establishing that henceforth ‘at least fifty-one per 
centum of the shares of every public company and any 
business shall be owned by indigenous Zimbabweans’ 
(Act 14/2007: 31a). According to interviews with the 
managers of the companies, the Indigenization Act has 
not been an impediment or constraint to them, as they 
have all been granted special agreements. Zimbabwean 
journalists have quoted state officials explaining that 
exemptions were given to Chinese companies, such 
as Tianze examined below, because ‘they have been 
supporting our agriculture and our farmers, so we look 
at those things when considering whether to exempt 
them or not’ (New Zimbabwe 2011).
Although all of these companies are exempt from 
the Act, each was established in Zimbabwe through 
different mechanisms, and they display a record of 
diverse relations with the government of Zimbabwe, 
the Chinese state, and also with other businesses in 
China and abroad. They have further benefited to 
different extents by their relations with the provincial 
governments. Tianze Tobacco, operating as a branch 
of the homonymous state-owned monopoly in China, 
has unsurprisingly received government support most 
extensively. Wanjin Company is the outcome of a joint 
venture between the Zimbabwean Ministry of Defence 
and a provincial SOE in China’s Anhui Province. The China-
Zimbabwe Agricultural Technology Demonstration 
Centre (ATDC) resulted after commitments were made 
by the Chinese in the FOCAC platform. The China-Africa 
Cotton Company is also privately-owned and finds its 
roots back in Shandong Province. The companies also 
have very different operational models, reflecting their 
diverse objectives and the arrangements that led to 
their establishment. So, Tianze and Wanjin support 
contract farming schemes and work with local farmers. 
The ATDC provides demonstrations and trainings, under 
the mandate of furthering development goals that it was 
contracted to meet, but also displays private enterprise 
modalities necessary to cover its operational cost. China-
Africa Cotton works with local farmers and is driven by 
commercial interests.
With data collected during the author’s fieldwork 
in China in 2013 and Zimbabwe in 2014, these studies 
provide an opportunity to explore the different types of 
Chinese SBRs operating in parts of sub-Saharan Africa 
by comparing how they negotiated their entry to the 
country; the companies and institutions that became 
involved in this process, their networks and connections; 
the political or financial support they received; and the 
ways that such processes were completed within the 
Zimbabwean political, business and social systems. 
Across our analysis we refer back to the typology and 
mechanisms of Chinese SBRs, examining those as a 
function of their different provincial origins, state or Party 
sponsorship, the nature of their financing, differing ways 
of engaging with informal business associations and 
their involvements with Chinese migrant communities 
in Africa. This approach enables us to look across these 
aspects in a more systematic, grounded fashion and show 
what this diversity may mean in practice. The studies 
also provide additional understanding of the way the 
Zimbabwean state has engaged in negotiations under 
an active and committed approach. 
Ca s e  1 :  Z i m b a bwe - C h i n a  Wa n j i n 
Agricultural Development Ltd – A ‘Role 
Model’ in Question
This company is a joint venture between the Anhui 
Provincial State FRMS Group and the Zimbabwean 
Ministry of Defence (MoD). In 2010 the Ministry of Defence 
used its bilateral relations with the Chinese government, 
to establish a joint farming scheme with an Anhui farm. 
Its objective was to support under-utilised Zimbabwean 
farms to improve their production. As of 2014, the venture 
had 50,000ha of land under cultivation. It reports more 
than 200 local employees (50 on contract) and 14 staff 
from China. On average, there are 1-2 Chinese managers 
and 3-5 local Zimbabwean managers on each farm. Ten 
staff members are from the Zimbabwean Ministry of 
Defence, including the Vice-Manager (holding the rank 
of General). The Manager, He Hongshun, commented, 
‘the reason we are in Zimbabwe is due to the Chinese 
“Going Global” policy.’1  The company benefitted from 
the encouragement of the Anhui provincial government 
and from the financial support of the China Exim Bank: 
‘We mainly deal with the Anhui Provincial Government, 
not the central government in Beijing,’ the manager 
observed. The company also benefitted from a strong 
network of Chinese construction and manufacturing 
services companies from Anhui province that had moved 
to Zimbabwe during the previous ten years. 
However, the manager also emphasised that the 
venture would not have succeeded had it not been under 
the aegis of the MoD in Zimbabwe. This is mainly because 
without leveraging its linkages to the Zimbabwean state, 
the company would have been challenged to develop 
linkages with local farms. He also admitted that in this 
process, ‘entrepreneurial spirit and good communication 
with the local community [were] very important; for 
example, we helped the local community to dig a well 
and build a road.’2  Profit and positive social impacts are 
regarded as two of the most important factors for the 
company. ‘But only profits should come first, this can then 
yield good social impact,’ he noted. Wanjin Company, 
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in other words, still operates as a private profit-making 
entity. The manager repeatedly praised the successes of 
the company, claiming that the company has achieved 
profits also furthering the development goals of its home 
province, Anhui. This emphasis on the linkages with the 
province and, equally, on the successes of the company 
could potentially manifest ambitions of promotion to 
home-based positions. Contrary to this emphasis on 
profits by the Zimbabwe-based manager, the Deputy 
General Manager of Anhui Provincial State Farms Group 
(APSFG) and Chairman of Wanjin based in Anhui Province, 
Chen Jun, emphasises developmental objectives. When 
he was interviewed by the China Daily, he explained that 
agricultural development requires long-term planning 
and sustainable practices.
We do not expect our investment in Zimbabwe 
to yield immediate returns. The real focus for 
our company is technology transfer and skills 
enhancement; factors critical for the long-
term success of agriculture in Zimbabwe. Our 
primary task is to train as many local agricultural 
technicians as possible, as science and technology 
hold the key to better results. (China Daily, 2014)
As the provinces compete to attract praise and 
attention from the central government in China, 
reflecting leadership ambition for promotion into the 
Chinese state machinery, it is not strange that Anhui 
provincial leaders emphasise the positive impact of the 
developmental aspect of the project, as prioritised by the 
central government. Nor is it surprising that the manager 
of the company emphasised instead the business success 
of the joint scheme. Managers of Chinese companies 
may also be motivated by personal ambition for future 
promotion by the Chinese government. Asked if he 
planned to stay in Zimbabwe, the manager answered 
that he wanted to go back to China. Zimbabwe was not 
regarded as home, but as a foreign land where life was 
ample with hardships encapsulated in the Chinese maxim 
‘chi ku’ (‘eat bitterness’). 
Opinions about Wanjin’s effectiveness vary. Vice-
Chancellor of Chinhoyi University of Technology David 
Jambgwa has stated that ‘The Wanjin project is a good 
role model for the Zimbabwean agricultural sector’ (China 
Daily, 2014). This seems to be validated in the testimonies 
of several farmers who suggested that had the company 
not operated, they would have been unable to afford 
the necessary inputs for cultivation of all the acreage in 
their possession 3. An expert from another company has 
challenged this rosy picture, however, saying that ‘it is all 
lies and self-boasting. We all know that it is difficult for 
foreigners to make a profit by farming in a short period 
in Zimbabwe. They only use the farming as a project to 
boost their image in order to bring other Chinese firms 
here.’ 4
Case 2: China-Zimbabwe Agricultural 
Technology Demonstration Centre – A 
‘Gilded Signboard’
The China-Zimbabwe Agricultural Technology 
Demonstration Centre is part of the China-Africa 
development agreement to establish China-Africa 
Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centres (ATDCs) 
across Africa. This agreement followed up President Hu’s 
pledge to FOCAC 2006, noted earlier, and Premier Wen 
Jiabao’s further pledge to FOCAC 2009 to construct up to 
25 ATDCs. These schemes have been agreed as a practical 
means for China to provide agricultural development 
support (technology and equipment) in a sustainable 
way to different African partners (Xiuli et al., this issue). 
ATDCs are run by Chinese companies after being selected 
through a competitive tender system in China. Although 
these companies are financially supported by the Chinese 
state during the first years of operation, they are expected 
to seek out ways to earn income and become self-
financing. They are also encouraged to investigate other 
business opportunities (Brautigam and Zhang 2013). 
The China-Zimbabwe Agricultural Technology 
Demonstration Centre was opened in 2012, and is located 
in Gwebi Agricultural College. The Centre’s managers 
are mainly from State-owned farms in Heilong Jiang 
Province. They do not have close contact with the local 
Chinese Association or networks in Zimbabwe. Initially, 
when the company arrived to the country, it received 
the support of the Zimbabwean Ministry of Agriculture, 
which attended the opening ceremony. According to 
ATDC staff, ‘The company uses the Centre’s name when 
it performs the function of public services, and adopts 
the company’s name when it conducts commercial 
operations.’5 Commercial activities have included selling 
farm machinery and farm products and providing 
ploughing or on-farm services to local farmers.
Two of the managers previously worked in a state-
owned farm in China, which clearly operated under a 
different model. As one explained: 
The fundamental problem with the ATDC is 
that the operating company has not been 
integrated or hung together with the Centre; 
it is the systemic failure of Chinese agriculture 
development assistance, one cannot simply 
extend the domestic institutions to Africa. Putting 
Chinese ‘parts’ in African governmental and 
society machine cannot improve the efficiency 
of the machine.6
The ATDCs are important platforms for Chinese 
business engagements, as seen in Zimbabwe and 
in Mozambique (see below). They are supported by 
the Chinese state through MOFCOM in their start-up 
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phase, but given their multiple objectives, there remain 
challenges, and many are finding it tough to operate 
purely on a commercial basis (Xiuli et al, this issue).
Case 3: Tianze Tobacco Ltd – ‘Business is 
Business’
Tianze Tobacco Ltd. is an SOE from Yunnan Province 
operating in Zimbabwe. It is a subsidiary of China Tobacco, 
the Chinese state-owned monopoly that produces the 
world’s largest number of cigarettes with roughly 2.4 
trillion cigarettes sold per annum. Most of these cigarette 
sales are in the Chinese domestic market. According to 
Zimbabwe’s Tobacco Industry and Marketing Board, 
some 58 percent of the Zimbabwean tobacco exports 
went to China during the first quarter of 2015, worth 
US$167.7m (Southern Times 2015). Buyers for the Chinese 
market were more discerning in their preference for top 
grades, for which they paid premium prices. Exports 
to that Chinese market accounted for 54.2 percent by 
value (TIMB, 2014). Historically, Yunnan has been very 
close to the centre. Since the reform era, the province 
has implemented development policies reflecting the 
priorities of the central government, orienting mainly 
toward economic growth through infrastructural 
development (Donaldson 2013: 7). 
Since its coming to Zimbabwe in 2005, Tianze has 
received support from the central Chinese government, 
which contributed to its quick rise. As the general 
manager confirmed, ‘Tianze’s ability to succeed in a 
relatively short period mainly benefitted from the 
Chinese market and financial support from the Exim 
Bank.’7  This support enabled the company to become 
competitive in Zimbabwe’s tobacco sector in a relatively 
short time. Zimbabwean state officials have been quoted 
explaining that exemptions were given to Chinese 
companies because ‘they have been supporting our 
agriculture and our farmers, so we look at those things 
when considering whether to exempt them or not’ (New 
Zimbabwe 2011).
These propitious conditions have influenced the 
performance of the company. Tianze’s local manager 
expressed no incentive to increase profits, reflecting 
the conditions in many SOEs: ‘It makes no difference to 
me if I make one dollar profit or one million dollar profit, 
because my salary is always the same.’ 
The company has 88 local workers and ten Chinese 
staff. The general manager, Li, said that he was impressed 
by the general quality of Zimbabwean workers. Tianze 
has good relations with its local farmers. ‘They (Tianze 
staff) help me build up the farm bit-by-bit every year. If 
they had left me, I could not have done anything and I 
would have not survived,’ a local farmer told Xinhua on 
his farm in Mashonaland (New Zimbabwe.Com News 
2014). Another farmer referred to by Xinhua chose Tianze 
because of better service: ‘I can visit the headquarters 
of Tianze and talk with Chinese managers, I can also 
get technical assistance from the company, such as on 
agronomy and curing, and these technologies are useful. 
Without the help of the company, I can’t grow tobacco.’  8
Tianze seems therefore to have established positive 
relationships with both the Zimbabwean government 
and the local farmers. The company also gained from the 
close relationships between the Chinese central state 
and Yunnan Province, and the strategic significance of 
the state-owned parent company. 
Case 4: The China Africa Cotton (CAC) 
Company in Zimbabwe
China Africa Cotton (CAC) is a privately-owned 
company established as a joint venture between Qingdao 
Ruichang Cotton Industrial Co, China-Africa Development 
(CAD) Fund and Qingdao Fuhui Textile Co. in 2008. The 
company now directly employs more than 3,000 people 
across Africa and has over 200,000 farmers supplying 
its cotton. Its profits hit US$6.5m by 2013. It began 
operations in Zimbabwe in 2013 and in Sofala Province 
in Mozambique in 2009. At US$60m, CAD’s investment in 
the enterprise has been significant. In an interview with 
China Daily, Zhao Jianping, Assistant General Manager at 
the China Development Bank, argued that this ‘company-
plus-farmer model’ is excellent for promoting sustainable 
development in Africa: ‘It not only brings technological 
support to Africa, but also introduces management 
experiences that help improve local economies.’ (China 
Daily 2014).
CAC is now the second-largest cotton processing 
company in Zimbabwe, after the local State-owned 
company. In Zimbabwe, it is working with more than 
29,000 contract farmers (out of the 200,000 among all 
companies) and commands the second largest share 
of the business among all registered cotton merchants 
in Zimbabwe.9  The company benefited a great deal 
from its previously established networks in Shandong 
Province. The current owner and the manager come 
from the same city – Qingdao – and both accumulated 
management knowledge and skills while running SOEs 
at home. The current owner afterwards established 
his own company in various parts of Africa, while the 
current manager in Zimbabwe previously managed a 
large textiles company in Zambia, the China-Zambia 
Mulungushi textiles company. He was hired by the China-
Africa Cotton Company owner to manage the Zimbabwe 
operation in 2013.  
CAC has also benefited from its networks at home in 
terms of its day-to-day operations. Because the company 
has had access to funding from the CADFund, it has been 
able to charge lower interest rates to cotton farmers in 
both countries, increasing its competitiveness against 
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other, including local, companies. The package offered 
by CAC also includes larger quantities of fertiliser and 
provision of first inputs early in the farming process. 
CAC in Zimbabwe did not have close relationships with 
the local Chinese embassy, despite being a member of 
the China-Africa Business Council. Instead CAC has built 
on provincial support form Shandong, financing from 
the CADFund, as well its senior staff’s long experience 
in Africa. 
Conclusions
This study demonstrates that the conventional wisdom 
of collusive state-business relations is misleading. 
Chinese SBRs are more complex. There is a proliferation 
of Chinese agencies in Africa acting independently or, 
depending upon ownership, semi-independently of 
the Chinese state. Driven by market pressures and the 
intensifying exposure to globalisation, Chinese firms 
(both state-owned and private) principally operate to 
their own commercial priorities – government and Party 
ownerships, policies and structures notwithstanding. 
Consequently, an important finding of this grounded 
research is the need, analytically and in terms of policy 
practice, to shift focus beyond the level of the state. 
This confirms a finding of earlier research on China-
Africa business relations (Gu 2009). As mentioned in 
the last section, a key feature of China’s agribusiness is 
that its ‘going global’ is driven significantly by China’s 
provinces with their own provincial SASAC, rather than 
the central government. Tianze from Yunnan Province 
has developed excellent relations with local Zimbabwean 
tobacco producers. It happened to benefit from a good 
provincial government–company relationship. However, 
its state ownership was a brake on the entrepreneurial 
spirit of its managers. A Qingdao private cotton company 
was supported by Chinese state subsidies, while it 
nonetheless had to conform to Zimbabwean regulations 
to assist local farmers if it was to acquire local cotton. This 
showed how each Chinese company had to negotiate 
local conditions independently to survive economically. 
One of the important findings of the fieldwork 
research for this study is that a source of difficulty in 
China’s engagement with African development is that the 
implementation of Chinese State policy is not consistent. 
This is as a result of a proliferation of Chinese agencies 
acting independently of one another, although all 
are ultimately a part of the Chinese state. This leaves 
policy lagging behind, for instance with respect to 
the development of a doctrine and practice of state–
private sector relations. For instance, salary policy in one 
provincial company may be a brake on entrepreneurial 
energy, while a Chinese state subsidy may, in another 
case, give a Chinese company an unusual competitive 
advantage. This is a key challenge not just for Africa, but 
for the Chinese themselves. 
The field research in China and Africa also highlights 
a problem in the implementation of the Chinese central 
government’s policy. Whilst at the central level there 
is strong enthusiasm and a great deal of emphasis is 
placed on China-Africa relations, this does not mean 
that it translates into efficient agricultural development 
assistance. The ATDCs are chosen and controlled by the 
central state in China, but the ATDC in Zimbabwe, for 
one, has not worked so well because Chinese agricultural 
models were not easily transferable to Africa and the 
ATDC was not able to realise the objective to become 
commercially self-financing. 
The Chinese state itself is changing, adapting both to 
globalisation and the inexorable logic of its own market-
oriented reforms. Within the contextual governance 
of Chinese SBRs in Africa, state policy lags behind, 
thereby creating a problem in the implementation of 
the Chinese central government’s policies. Consequently, 
despite the conventional wisdom of a collusive Chinese 
SBRs, in the African context, at least, many Chinese 
agricultural enterprises do not have much knowledge 
or understanding of the state’s policies relating to ‘going 
global’ and investing in Africa. Here business associations, 
notably the China-Africa Business Association, have 
started to step in, providing better quality information, 
training and advice to Chinese firms heading for Africa. 
The fundamental problem remains, however, that there 
has not yet developed a fully worked out relationship 
between the Chinese business and public sectors. 
The analysis suggests that the conventional wisdom 
of a homogenised SBR driven by the Chinese central 
government is, at best, a partial picture. The central 
point about Chinese overall involvement in Africa, 
and in African agriculture, is that it is driven less by the 
government in Beijing and much more by the needs 
of China’s provincial governments. What is important 
to understand here is that the centre and provinces 
might envision the role of the private sector according 
to diverse conceptualisations of and engagement with 
‘state capitalism’ (for example, see Donaldson 2013). In 
addition, companies might behave differently in foreign 
markets, a function of factors such as their dependence 
on Chinese state financing (and thus, influence by state 
interests), their own profit-making goals and their level 
of competitiveness abroad. This paper serves as a rich 
empirical source for the investigation of the ways in 
which Chinese SBRs operate in practice in Africa, for our 
understanding of China’s developmental role in Africa 
and for our understanding of the wider questions, issues 
and debates surrounding the nature and significance of 
Chinese SBRs.
In summary, it is important to keep in mind that the 
Chinese ‘state’ does not exist in a unitary form or position, 
and that in fact ‘the state’ takes on many forms given 
the way Chinese provincial and local authority and 
business is organised. In this hydra-headed condition, 
business plays out in different ways. This depends on the 
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investment, the timeframe and the type of actor involved. 
Critically for our closer understanding of China’s SBRs, 
not all are standard, Party-driven, centralised SOEs, but 
a multiplicity of actors. If China is not a homogenised 
bloc, it is also important to remind ourselves that Africa 
is not silent, passive or impotent, but has active agency. 
We have seen that the survival of a provincial Chinese 
tobacco company and of a private Chinese cotton 
company in Zimbabwe depended very significantly 
on the different forms of positive synergy with local 
African conditions. Much of this success is informal, 
unplanned, negotiated, decentralised, uncoordinated 
and run through highly diversified routes, including 
business associations, migrant networks and a range of 
provincial level companies and enterprises. All have ‘the 
state’ embedded in them as part of their relationships but 
in different ways and to varying degree, adding to the 
complexity and contingency in explaining China-Africa 
relations on the ground in key sectors such as agriculture.
End Notes
1  Author interview. Wanjin Agricultural Development 
Ltd. General Manager, Harare, Zimbabwe, 7 May 
2014.
2  Author interview. Wanjin Agricultural Development 
Ltd. General Manager, Harare, Zimbabwe, 7 May 
2014.
3  Author interview. Farmer, Harare, Zimbabwe, 9 May 
2014.
4 Author interview. Company Executive, Harare, 
Zimbabwe, 9 May 2014.
5 Author interview. ATDC Manager, Harare, Zimbabwe, 
8 May 2014
6 Author interview. ATDC Manager, Harare, Zimbabwe, 
9 May 2014.
7 Author interview. Tianze Tobacco Ltd. Manager, 
Harare, Zimbabwe, 7 May 2014.
8 Author interview. Ms Moyo, a 51-year-old newly 
resettled farmer and head of household of six, 
Harare, Zimbabwe, May 2014
9 Author interview. Zimbabwe Cotton Growers 
Association Executive, Harare, Zimbabwe, May 
2014.
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